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Where	will	the	UK’s	aid	budget	go	when	it	stops
contributing	to	the	EU?
Britain	is	a	major	contributor	to	the	EU	aid	budget.	Sophia	Price	(Leeds	Beckett	University)
discusses	how	Britain	might	choose	to	spend	its	aid	budget	once	its	obligations	to	the	EU	–	a
key	element	of	the	‘divorce	bill’	–	are	fulfilled.	Will	it	continue	to	direct	money	towards	countries
with	which	it	hopes	to	forge	stronger	trading	relationships?	Can	it	maintain	the	leverage	it
enjoyed	as	an	important	player	in	the	Union?	Will	it	face	calls	to	step	in	when	the	EU	cuts	back
its	commitments,	particularly	in	regions	with	historic	ties	to	Britain,	like	the	Caribbean?
A	drop	in	the	value	of	sterling	would	also	effectively	cut	the	UK’s	contributions.
Securing	an	agreement	on	the	Brexit	‘divorce	bill’	remains	a	stumbling	block	in	the	negotiations	between	the	UK
and	EU.	The	size	of	this	financial	contribution	rests	on	an	assessment	of	both	current	and	future	obligations.	It	is
an	area	that	has	shown	little	evidence	of	progression	in	the	negotiations,	and	is	a	barrier	to	moving	onto	post-
Brexit	trade	arrangements.
There	have	been	widely	divergent	assessments	of	the	likely	scale	of	the	‘divorce	bill’.	While	the	EU	has	not
explicitly	set	a	figure,	it	has	published	the	methodology	for	its	calculation.	The	UK	has	been	less	clear	in	relation
to	quantifying	the	actual	sum,	although	in	her	Florence	speech	on	22	September	Theresa	May	said	that	“the	UK
will	honour	commitments	we	have	made	during	the	period	of	our	membership.”
High	Representative	of	the	EU	Federica	Mogherini	with	Dr	Nkosazana	Dlamini	Zuma,
chairperson	of	the	African	Union,	in	2015.	Photo:	CC-BY-NC-ND	2.0	licence
A	significant	proportion	of	the	UK’s	financial	commitments	to	the	EU	is	in	the	form	of	the	development	aid.	The
EU	is	the	world’s	largest	donor,	providing	half	of	all	international	aid,	which,	coupled	with	international	trade
provisions,	underpins	the	operation	of	its	development	cooperation	relations.	These	span	all	areas	of	the	global
south,	including	Latin	America,	Central	Asia	and	the	Gulf.		The	widest	and	longest	standing	of	the	EU’s
development/trade	relations	with	developing	countries	is	with	the	79	African,	Caribbean	and	Pacific	states	that
form	the	‘ACP’	Group.	The	EU-ACP	relationship	has	its	own	funding	mechanism,	the	European	Development
Fund	(EDF),	which	sits	outside	of	the	EU	budget.
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UK	contributions	to	EU	aid	are	significant,	at	€4.5bn	(2014-2020).	It	is	the	third	largest	contributor	to	the	EDF
(after	Germany	and	France)	and	provides	approximately	15%	of	the	total	EDF	funding.	UK	EDF	contributions	are
next	due	to	be	paid	in	2018,	highlighting	the	importance	of	both	the	calculation	and	timing	of	the	divorce	bill	for
the	UK,	the	EU	and	states	across	the	global	south.
While	the	UK’s	role	in	the	EU’s	development	relations	has	not	been	at	the	forefront	of	the	discussions	about	the
divorce	bill,	a	number	of	the	debates	surrounding	the	referendum	have	alluded	–	directly	–	and	indirectly	–	to
them.	Most	notable	was	the	argument	made	by	Boris	Johnson	that	through	EU	membership	the	UK	had
‘betrayed’	its	former	colonies	and	partners	in	the	Commonwealth,	and	that	Brexit	would	provide	an	opportunity	to
re-engage	with	these	relationships	under	the	banner	of	‘Global	Britain’.
Various	commentators	have	argued	that	this	‘betrayal’	is	a	myth	(see	Murray-	Evans,	and	Price),	and	that	through
the	EU	that	the	UK	has	been	able	to	continue	to	play	and	even	extend	its	global	role.	By	joining	the	EU	in	1973
the	UK	was	able	to	collectivise	its	obligations	to	its	former	colonies,	particularly	those	in	Africa	and	the	Caribbean,
through	the	EU-	ACP	relationship.	Moreover,	this	relationship	extended	the	scope	of	UK	relations	with	states	in
the	global	south,	linking	the	UK	to	the	former	colonies	of	other	member	states,	particularly	France.
It	is	through	EU	membership	that	the	UK	has	been	able	to	expand	the	reach	of	its	external	relations	to	areas
where	its	presence	was	previously	limited	or	declining.	By	extending	reach	–	and	sharing	prior	obligations	–	this
has	also	provided	good	value	for	money	in	UK	aid	spending	(Watkins	2016).		The	UK	government	recognised
this,	stating	in	2013	that	the	“reach	and	magnitude	of	EU	financial	instruments”	outweighs	those	the	UK	could
bring	to	bear	bilaterally	and	that	this	has	allowed	the	UK	to	maximise	the	use	of	its	(scarce)	resources,	particularly
in	times	of	austerity.
The	UK	has	also	played	a	leading	role	in	EU	development	cooperation	relations.		It	has	been	able	to	align	EU	and
broader	agendas	with	its	own	objectives,	for	example	through	linking	the	Department	for	International
Development	(DfID)	and	the	EU	with	the	Millennium	Development	Goals	and	now	the	2015	Sustainable
Development	Goals.	The	UK’s	ability	to	leverage	EU	aid	to	enhance	its	own	objectives	can	be	seen	through	the
inclusion	of	various	UK	preferences	for	EU	aid	policy.	According	to	Andrew	Sherriff,	head	of	the	European
External	Action	Programme:
“The	UK	has	had	an	influence	on	the	EU’s	focus	and	expertise	on	the	0.7%	target	for	aid,	the	SDGs,
the	value	for	money	and	results	agenda,	differentiation	in	EU	aid	to	focus	more	on	least	development
countries	and	fragile	states”	(ECPDM	2016).
The	perception	of	UK	influence	is	also	one	held	by	UK	policy	makers	themselves,	who	consider	themselves
‘determinant	actors’	in	aid	allocation	and	with	the	EU	acting	as	a	‘a	catalyst	for	their	own	aid’	(Olivie	and	Perez).
	Smith	(2016)	argues	that	through	the	coordination	with	the	EU	the	UK	has	been	able	to	‘punch	above	its	weight’
and	that	outside	the	EU	it	will	struggle	to	have	the	same	level	of	global	reach	and	influence.
Brexit	has	been	presented	as	an	opportunity	to	forge	a	new	role	in	the	world,	as	a	‘Truly	Global	Britain’.	This
agenda	is	central	to	DFID’s	2017	Economic	Development	Strategy:	Prosperity,	Poverty	and	Meeting	Global
Challenges		which	says	“Britain	is	redefining	and	reinforcing	its	place	in	the	world’.		However,	EU	membership
has	enabled	the	UK	to	play	a	leadership	role	both	in	the	formulation	and	operation	of	regional	and	global
development	policy	and	practice.	Rather	than	enhancing	the	UK’s	global	role,	Brexit	threatens	to	undermine	it.
While	May’s	confirmation	that	her	government	intends	to	meet	its	existing	EU	financial	commitments	suggests
that	the	UK	will	continue	to	contribute	to	EU	development	funding	until	it	leaves,	what	happens	after	Brexit
remains	open	to	question.	The	EU	will	have	lost	one	of	the	largest	contributors	to	its	development	funding,	and
will	be	faced	with	either	trying	to	fill	the	gap	or	reducing	its	commitments.	Given	that	many	EU	member	states
have	been	cutting	their	aid	budgets,	it	seems	optimistic	to	hope	that	the	EU27	will	be	willing	to	increase	their
commitments	to	compensate	for	UK	withdrawal.	This	might	be	a	concern	for	particular	areas,	such	as	the
Caribbean	states,	whose	interests	have	traditionally	been	championed	by	the	UK.	Moreover,	the	shape	of	EU
development	policy	is	likely	to	change	without	the	UK’s	input.
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If	the	UK	decides	to	continue	with	its	current	aid	spending	commitment	of	0.7%	of	GNI,	it	would	imply	that	funds
would	return	to	the	control	of	national	government.	The	UK	could	either	focus	this	funding	on	bilateral	or
multilateral	partners.	After	the	2011	Bilateral	Aid	Review	the	number	of	bilateral	aid	partners	fell	from	78	to	just	28
by	2012,	and	includes	low-middle	income	and	upper-middle	income	countries	as	well	as	least	developed
countries	(UK	Aid	Network	2017).	Although	Brexit	might	disrupt	this	trend,	there	would	be	high	costs	associated
with	attempts	to	reach	the	same	number	of	countries	as	the	UK	does	through	the	EU.	While	it	may	be	possible	to
form	new	multilateral	partnerships,	it	is	questionable	whether	they	would	have	the	same	scale,	scope	and
influence	as	the	EU	afforded.
Even	if	the	level	of	aid	contributions	is	maintained,	Brexit	could	affect	their	scale	if	–	as	economists	predict	–	an
exit	shock	leads	to	a	contraction	in	GNI	and/or	there	is	further	devaluation	of	sterling.
An	allied	trend	in	UK	aid	policy	has	been	the	pursuit	of	‘mutual	benefits’	and	the	promotion	of	UK	business
interests	abroad.	Priti	Patel	has	said	that	aid	reclaimed	from	the	EU		would	be	spent	in	‘the	national	interest’	for
‘prosperity	Britain	post-	Brexit,	on	trade	and	economic	development’.	This	confirms	a	UK	Aid	Network	statement
that	‘UK	aid	seems	to	be	driven	by	UK	priorities	less	clearly	aligned	to	partner	countries’	development	strategies;
aid	remains	‘informally’	tied	with	most	contracts	going	to	UK-based	firms”.	Indeed,	rather	than	creating	a	‘truly
global	UK’,	Brexit	might	mark	a	turn	to	a	more	parochial	set	of	relationships	based	on	the	pursuit	of	narrow
interests	over	the	more	general	needs	of	‘global	development’.
In	sum,	there	is	a	significant	danger	that	Brexit	will	deliver	the	exact	opposite	of	‘Global	Britain’	and	significantly
narrow	and	reduce	UK	influence	in	the	world	while	reducing	aid	to	the	poorest	parts	of	the	global	population.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Sophia	Price	is	Head	of	Politics	and	International	Relations	at	Leeds	Beckett	University.
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